TRIGGER WARNING: The following article contains nuclear-grade Real Talk. If you havenâ€™t taken your iron-pill today, you might want to read something else. Even for hard-core Stormfront proles, the conclusion may be tough to swallow.
The Jewish Question and the Woman Question are rather tedious. Both issues are intrinsically â€˜low.â€™ People of common intellect find them interesting only because of their tendentiousness. Serious intellectuals, on the other hand, tend to shy away from such subjects, lest they be distracted from matters of greater philosophical depth. While acknowledging the bad, one should, like Xenophonâ€™s Socrates, focus on the good. However, these two questionsâ€“on Jews and womenâ€“cannot be avoided. They are of critical import in dealing with history, political philosophy and sociology. For a man to have any understanding of his world, he is forced to grapple with these two most mundane of issues.
As expected, given the generally lower intellects attracted to them, most of what is said about Jews and women is utter garbage. Just check your local university. So it is rare to find an author who addresses either question with the appropriate gravity. Such an author is Otto Weininger (1880-1903), who tackles both issues in his magnum opus Sex and Character. Weininger was an Austrian Jew who committed suicide at 23, but who, despite his short life, attained an unusually mature level of philosophical development. The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein went so far as to call him a genius (albeit with certain reservations). Sex and Character is nowadays universally panned as misogynist, anti-Semitic and all-around evil. So you know it has to be good.
Continue reading Otto Weininger: The Jew Who Saved Me
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A More Promising Approach
Mieroopâ€™s work fails to define epistemology narrowly enough, and cultural relativism is to blame. Another problem is that, unless a philosophical treatise turns up in cuneiform, any evidence of Babylonian philosophy is indirect. But Mieroopâ€™s quest for Mesopotamian philosophy is not hopeless. With superior method, we might yet uncover something of the Babyloniansâ€™ intellectual life. I propose three methods: (1) Using better-documented philosophical traditions as control variables, (2) comparing Babylonian religious and literary texts with the fragments of the Presocratics, and (3) analyzing the thematic development of Babylonian literature, insofar as it can be traced.
The first is the least ambitious method. It would use better-documented, philosophical traditions to evaluate claims about Babylonian intellectual history. The better-documented tradition would act as a control variable. Too bad Mieroop did not think of it, because this method destroys a core assumption of his thesisâ€“that any complicated thinking presupposes epistemology. So then, is there civilization with complicated thinking, even systematic philosophy, but devoid of epistemology?
Continue reading Babylonian Philosophy? Part 3
back toÂ part 1, on to part 3
Mieroop suffers from cultural relativism, like much of academia. Cultural relativism (or just â€œrelativismâ€) stems from the assumption that we cannot value any of the achievements of Western cultureâ€™s over the achievements of another culture. To do so would mean we have acted out of pro-Western bias. But what if the Western culture did achieve something of objectively higher value? Would acknowledging western cultureâ€™s qualitative superiority in that particular matter mean we are biased?
To the preceding questions, a relativist would answer that no such valuation is possible, that we cannot value cultural achievements objectively. And he would be right, at least regarding certain realms of cultural achievement, such as literature. Â It is nearly impossible to compare one literary tradition to another. The scholar of literature faces all sorts of impediments: differences of tastes, language, historical and cultural references. Literary taste depends on culture and education, it is subjective.
But relativism is unhelpful in objective matters. It causes scholars to abjure making qualitative distinctions between the achievements of one culture and another, even in realms like mathematics and science that can be compared objectively. No one would assert that the ancient Egyptians attained a higher level of mathematics than the medieval Muslims. That is not to denigrate the Egyptians, of course their Muslim successors attained greater heights because â€œthey stood on the shoulders of giants.â€ But claiming that the Egyptians invented trigonometry would be ridiculous. Like mathematics, epistemology belongs to the objective realm. Certain methods of discerning truth are better than othersâ€“they can be more or less systematic, and lead to more accurate results. So while it is difficult to weigh the relative merits of, say, Greek and Chinese literature (a subjective assessment), it is not difficult to judge the Greek philosophical achievement as superior to the Somali.
Continue reading Babylonian Philosophy? Part 2
A Review ofÂ Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia by Columbia Professor Marc van de Mieroop. (Note: This review originally ran in November 2015 atÂ The Ritter Review, a blog set up by Greg Ritter before the founding of AI. We have reason to believe that the author has read it and reached trigger-factor 5. This is what happens when you exclude all the smart people from academia. heh).
by Gregory Ritter
Like many in academia, Columbia professor Marc van de Mieroop brings up a fascinating question, then manages to bungle his answer. In Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia he asks whether the ancient Babylonians developed epistemology. Epistemology, or â€œtheory of knowledge,â€ is the study of knowledge, or as Plato defined it, true, justified belief. It has been regarded as central to all philosophy since ancient Greece. Because they developed epistemology, the Greek philosophers have held a unique place in intellectual historyâ€”indeed, for centuries, Western scholars have considered the Greek contribution to be fundamental. If the Babylonians got to epistemology before the Greeks, intellectual history will have to be entirely rewritten. Mieroop argues that they did, that the Babylonians had a developed theory of knowledge. But no one has discovered evidence of such, despite the hundreds of thousands of cuneiform tablets discovered since the mid-nineteenth century. So Mieroopâ€™s thesis is quite ambitious. He offers several arguments in its support. The attempt is noble, but the conclusions are outrageous. This failure can only be attributed to an unimaginative method and an inexplicable ignorance of basic philosophical concepts. In these shortcomings, his work is an example of academiaâ€™s over-specialization and relativist groupthink.
Mieroopâ€™s thesis has three major defects. First, he does not understand what epistemology is. Second, he overstates his case by failing to make a qualitative distinction between the rigorous Greek search for truth and Mesopotamian pre-philosophic learning. Third, he claims to disagree with earlier scholarsâ€™ assessments, but manages to reach to the same conclusions, albeit dressed up in cultural-relativist garb. This last defect, his cultural relativism, is the cause of the first two. Relativism prevents him from recognizing that the Greeksâ€™ philosophical achievements were of higher quality. He magnifies the Babylonian intellectual achievement by a herculean effort at blurring categories, leading to his argumentâ€™s internal contradictions. Continue reading Babylonian Philosophy? Part 1
Flip through a historical atlas of Europe. Starting at AD 100, there is only Rome. North of the Danube circle dozens of obscure Latinate names designating Germanic tribes.
Fast forward 900 years and a vaguely recognizable Europe seems to be taking shape. France, England, Poland are all there, albeit a bit contorted. If your curiosity was piqued, you could easily find an entire book, dedicated to the history of any one of those countries, including its early development:
On that same map, c. 1000, you would also find a quite novel political entity–The Holy Roman Empire. It dominates central Europe, what is now Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, northern Italy and Franceâ€™s eastern borderlands. But now try to find out more. Where can you turn?
Sure, there are general histories of Medieval Europe. There are also histories of Germany that cover its pre-unification metamorphosis. But rare are books dedicated to the Holy Roman Empire explicitly, although there are a few. Most recently came Joachim Whaleyâ€™s two-part Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (2012). Whaleyâ€™s book is packed with information and analysis, which is exciting for history buffs and academics. But those with a more casual interest are out of luck.
That changed last month. Heart of Europe, A History of the Holy Roman Empire by Oxford professor Peter H. Wilson at last filled the gap. It is a readable, non-specialist book on the â€œotherâ€ Roman Empire. But you will be disappointed if you are looking for an enthralling, narrative history. While readable, Wilsonâ€™s book fails to bring much order from the chaos that was the Holy Roman Empire. Continue reading Book Review: Heart of Europe, A History of the Holy Roman Empire